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The Use of Accounting Data to Predict Bank Financial Distress in MENA Countries 
 
 Isabelle Distinguin, Iftekhar Hasan, and Amine Tarazi 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 In the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) region, little has been written on the 
prediction of bank failures. The recent financial crisis, declining bank health and government 
subsidization or injection of cash flow by the government sector to revive or save banking 
institutions from failing, have heightened interest in the role of the banking sector in the 
economy especially since most studies in this area pinpoint particular weaknesses in the sector 
which aggravated the crisis. However, most studies focus on early-warning models of banking 
crises (Demirgüc-Kunt and Degatriache 2000) and do not consider the prediction of bank’s 
financial deterioration at the individual bank level. 
 
 The objectives of this paper are multiple.  First, to construct an early-warning system 
of bank financial distress specifically designed for MENA banks. The paper also looks into 
the reliability and stability of early indicators depending on the size of the bank and on its 
balance sheet structure. Using experiences of 13 banking sectors in MENA countries as a 
point of study, this paper starts by building an early-warning model based on downgrades by 
the Fitch rating agency and a large set of accounting indicators.  
 
 Our paper proposes a framework that can be implemented for MENA banks, and 
which enables us to further raise two theoretical issues.  First, our approach, which is applied 
on a wide range of MENA banks, enables to use annual frequency accounting data without 
imposing interpolation of these data. This point is important because for many MENA banks 
only yearly accounting data are available.  Second, instead of focusing on bank failures or on 
severe financial distress, we consider the prediction of any downward change in a bank’s 
financial health.1 Our view is that early detection of downgrades might play a major role in 
the implementation of prompt corrective action by regulators, and that it can do so without 
jeopardizing the strategies followed by bank managers. We deal with the issue of identifying 
                                                 
1 Given regulators hardly declare bank failures but  rather arrange restructuring or mergers with other healthy 
banks,  then considering the prediction of any downward change in a bank’s financial health is a good alternative 
to understand the extent of distress or potential failure. 
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deterioration in banks’ future financial health by considering the information contained in the 
changes in indicators such as financial ratios, rather than in their level.  Third, we also wish to 
test the robustness of results in light of the modern financial intermediation theory developed 
by Leland and Pyle (1977), Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and Diamond (1984). These studies 
consider that banks and financial intermediaries are agents that play a major role in the 
financial system as information intermediaries. Banks collect and process information about 
loan customers (Diamond 1984), which implies that they possess private information. 
Therefore, due to banks’ inherent opacity, we question the ability of accounting indicators to 
explain banks degradation of financial situation. We also consider the potential influence of 
the size of the bank on the effectiveness of accounting indicators. Indeed, we can assume that 
bank size affects the reliability of accounting indicators. We might suppose that accounting 
information is less reliable for smaller banks because accounting standards are generally less 
stringent for smaller banks (lower quality and lower disclosure frequency).This would be the 
first comprehensive attempt to better understand the banking distress in the region using a 
long time series data including information on banks from years as late as 2008. 
 
1. Methodology 
 
As a first step, we test for the contributions of various accounting indicators to the prediction 
of bank financial distress. We then study the stability of the predictive power of early warning 
indicators with respect to bank size and balance sheet structure.  To start off, it is necessary to 
establish an event that could represent a change in the financial condition of a bank. Most 
studies in the US conducted in this area either make use of explicit bank failures or 
supervisory ratings downgrades as in Curry, Elmer and Fissel (2007), Kolari et al. (2002) and 
Gunther, Levonian, and Moore (2001). On the other hand, studies on European banks make 
use of sharp downgrades (Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes 2006) as proxies for actual bank failure 
or downgrade announcements by private agencies2 (Distinguin, Rous and Tarazi 2006) as 
proxies for financial distress. Since actual bank failure is quite limited in MENA, this paper 
will follow Distinguin, Rous and Tarazi (2006) using downgrading announcements to 
represent deteriorations in the bank’s financial condition. These downgrading announcements 
are obtained from the Fitch rating agency. 
                                                 
2 Due to confidentiality laws in most countries, it is difficult to gain access to explicit supervisory ratings in 
Europe. 
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Accounting Cji indicators are computed to estimate the probability of a downgrade. However, 
accounting data are available only annually. As such, the starting point for this study is 
December 31st of each year - when accounting information is available. Events taking place 
during the following calendar year are then considered, which avoids the interpolation of 
missing accounting data and ensures that the information content of accounting data is not 
inappropriately upward biased. 
 
For each bank in the sample, the dependent variable Y is equal to:  
 1, if the bank is downgraded by Fitch with no upgrading taking place during the entire 
calendar year and no downgrade or upgrade during the last quarter of the preceding 
year;  
 0, if the rating remains unaltered during the calendar year and; 
 NA (not available), for all other cases.  
 
 
The following logit model is employed to estimate the probability of a downgrade: 
Prob 
1
1
J
i j ji
j
Y C 

        
where Cji is the jth accounting indicator and  .  denotes the cumulated logistic distribution 
function. Maximum likelihood estimators of the coefficients  , j   are used and robust 
Huber-White covariance matrix estimation allows for possible misspecification of the error 
term distribution. 
 
The best accounting indicators are selected through a stepwise process.3  
 
However, due to the possible existence of a size effect and a balance sheet structure effect, 
there is a need to test for the stability of the relationship. We also conduct estimations of the 
different models on restricted samples of banks and using dummy variables. 
 
3. Sample and Indicators 
 
3.1. Sample 
                                                 
3 As a rule of thumb, a 10 percent level for type 1 error is retained and a Max (Min) LR statistic is used as a 
criterion for adding (ruling out) each potential indicator to (from) the selected set. 
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Our sample consists of 67 commercial banks from 13 countries: Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, and United 
Arab Emirates. These banks are rated by the Fitch rating agency.   
 
Table 1 presents the distribution of banks by country. Information is taken from Bankscope 
Fitch IBCA. 
 
Insert Table 1 
 
Accounting data (annual financial statements) for the banks in our sample are obtained from 
Bankscope Fitch IBCA. Our econometric specification imposes the use of accounting data 
ranging from 1996 to 2007 to predict downgrades that occurred between 1998 and 2008. 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for our sample of banks. The banks are categorized into 
three groups A, B, and C. The bank is classified as group A, if it is from Egypt, Lebanon, 
Morocco or Tunisia; then group B, if from Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia or 
United Arab Emirates, and group C, if from Israel or Turkey. It seems more prudent to group 
the banks into country categories as the three country groups exhibit different characteristics 
particularly with respect to the level of development of their financial system. The data 
exhibit a high level of heterogeneity, enabling us to investigate the accuracy of accounting 
indicators to predict downgrades for different sizes and types of institutions. 
 
Insert Table 2 
 
3.2. Financial deterioration indicator 
Table 3 provides information on the downgrades used in this study. These downgrades are 
announced by the rating agency Fitch. Ratings information is obtained from Bankscope Fitch 
IBCA. Since several restrictions are applied on the construction of the binary dependent 
variable Y, only a limited number of “clean” downgrades are subsequently considered in this 
study. For example, if several downgrades occur during the calendar year, we only consider 
the first one. Of the total 109 downgrades, only 52 “clean” downgrades are used for the 
estimations. Besides, among these 52 downgrades several happened the same day, for 
example a bank can be downgraded both for the Fitch Short Term and the Fitch Long Term 
rating at the same day. This implies that only 46 events can be used in this study.  
 
5 
 
Table 4 provides information on the distribution of Fitch Individual, Fitch Long Term, and 
Fitch Short Term downgrades. We can notice that most of the ratings are in the speculative 
grades for debt ratings and as low as C or less for individual ratings.  
 
Insert Table 3 and Table 4 
 
3.3. Accounting indicators 
 
 In this study, we consider a set of accounting ratios (see Table 5) commonly used in 
the assessment of bank financial health. We group these ratios into the four categories of the 
CAEL (Capital, Asset quality, Earnings and Liquidity) rating.  Previous studies in this area 
either consider accounting ratios in level (Curry, Elmer and Fissel 2007, Gunther, Levonian, 
and Moore 2001) or in variation (first order difference) (Distinguin, Rous and Tarazi 2006). 
In this study, as we aim to predict changes in the financial condition of the bank, it seems 
more appropriate to consider the changes in the values of the ratios. More importantly, our 
study requires equal consideration of banks regardless of their initial financial strength. More 
precisely, the downgrade of a sound and safe bank as compared to a modestly performing 
bank can only be captured by a change in the values of the ratios of this bank. Consequently, 
Cji is defined as the annual change in the value of the accounting ratio Rji. 
 
Insert Table 5 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
 We first consider the predictive power of accounting indicators via a stepwise process. 
Then, dummy variables are introduced and sub-samples are defined to capture the influence 
of the size of the bank and of its balance sheet structure on the effectiveness of early 
indicators. 
As a preliminary step, univariate regressions are conducted. They are ran on the whole sample 
of banks without taking into account the regional sub-groups defined in 3.1.  (whole sample 
column in Table 6), they are also ran taking into account country group differences by 
introducing two dummy variables GROUPA and GROUPC which are equal to one for banks 
belonging to the considered group (regional dummies column in Table 6) or running the 
regressions on the three different subgroups. 
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4.1. Simple regression results 
 Table 6 shows the results for the univariate regressions on the accounting indicators 
for MENA banks. Results are only reported when the coefficients are at least significant at the 
10 percent level. 
 
Insert Table 6 
 
 We can notice that the results obtained with regional dummies are quite similar to 
those obtained without introducing these dummies. Indeed, the dummy variables are never 
significant in the regressions. Thus, in the following estimations we no longer take these 
dummies into account.  
 Considering the whole sample results, we can see that at least one indicator in each 
category (Capital, Asset quality, Earnings, and Liquidity) appears as significant. For capital 
adequacy indicators, those reflecting a change in hybrid capital appear significant at the 5 
percent level. Two indicators of asset quality are also significant: the change in the ratio of 
loan loss reserves to gross loans (LLR_GL) and the change in the ratio of impaired loans to 
gross loans (IMPLOANS_GL). As expected, they are both positively linked with banks 
financial distress. Four indicators reflecting changes in the profitability/earnings ratios are 
also significant at least at the 5 percent level. The signs of the coefficients are all consistent 
with the expected negative relationship between profitability and bank financial distress and 
the expected positive relationship between cost or expenses and bank financial distress. The 
changes in the liquidity ratio NL_CSTFUND is also significant at 10 percent. But, the 
negative sign of the coefficient is not consistent with the expected negative relationship 
between liquidity and bank financial distress.  
 When we consider the results for the different sub-groups, we can notice that for 
Group A and Group B banks, at least one indicator is significant in each category. For Group 
C banks only three indicators appear as significant, two indicators corresponding to a change 
in the capital to risk weighted assets ratios (TCR and TIER1RATIO) and an indicator 
reflecting asset quality (LLP_NIR). 
 
4.2. Contribution of accounting indicators 
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 After conducting the univariate regressions and initially determining the set of 
indicators that are significant, a stepwise procedure is considered. Table 7 presents the results 
for the stepwise procedure based on the full set of accounting indicators. We run the stepwise 
process on the whole sample of banks and on the three sub-samples corresponding to the 
regional groups (Group A, Group B, and Group C) previously discussed. 
 
Insert Table 7 
 
The stepwise results show that, on the whole, asset quality and earnings indicators are the 
optimal predictors of bank financial distress. Indeed, when we consider the results obtained on 
the whole sample of banks, ΔCOSTTOINCOME is significant at the 1 percent level. This 
ratio measures the costs of running the bank as a percentage of income generated before 
provisions. As expected, there is a negative relationship between the efficiency of the bank 
and the probability of a future downgrade. ΔLLP_NIR and ΔIMPLOANS_GL, both reflecting 
problems in bank asset quality, are, as expected, positively and significantly related to banks 
financial distress.  
 Results for Group A and Group B are quite the same as for each group both asset 
quality and earnings indicators are selected by the stepwise process: the change in the ratio of 
net interest revenue to average assets (NIR_A) and the change in the ratio of loan loss 
reserves to gross loans (LLR_GL) for Group A and the changes in the cost to income ratio 
(COSTTOINCOME) and in two ratios reflecting asset quality (IMPLOANS_GL, LLP_TA) 
for Group B. For Group C, one indicator reflecting capitalization appears as significant 
(ΔEQU_DEPSTFUND) at the 10 percent level but its coefficient has the wrong sign. For 
group C, an indicator of asset quality, the change in the ratio of loan loss provisions to net 
interest revenue (LLP_NIR), is also significant.  
 
 As previously mentioned, the possible existence of size and balance sheet structure 
effects might limit the accuracy of early indicators in the prediction process. Thus, we 
consider the influence of size and balance sheet structure on the effectiveness of accounting 
indicators by running the regressions on different sub-samples. Due to the limited number of 
observations available on the different regional sub-groups, in the following regressions, we 
do not separate banks on the basis of these sub-groups. 
 
4.3. Size effect 
8 
 
 
 We might suppose that the accuracy of accounting indicators to predict bank financial 
distress is lower for small banks. Indeed, accounting information may be less reliable for 
smaller banks because accounting standards are generally less stringent for them (lower 
quality and lower disclosure frequency). Thus, accounting indicators may be more effective 
for banks that have a major position in their domestic banking system. 
 
Thus, to consider the possible existence of a size effect on the accuracy of early indicators, 
estimations are conducted on two sub-samples: 
 Too Big To Fail banks, that is, banks with a Fitch Support rating equal to 1 or 2. 
This support rating indicates the likelihood of public or private support on a scale 
from 1 to 4; a grade of 1 (the highest) indicates the presence of an assured legal 
guarantee. FitchRatings Support Ratings are commonly used in the literature to 
identify too-big-to-fail banks operating outside the US (see Gropp, Vesala, and 
Vulpes 2006; and Distinguin, Rous, and Tarazi 2006). 
 Non Too Big To Fail banks, that is, banks with a Fitch Support rating lower than 2. 
 
The results obtained for the size effect are presented in Table 8.  
 
Insert Table 8 
 
Considering the same indicators that are selected on the whole sample of banks, we can notice 
that these indicators are significant only for large banks. None of these indicators appear 
significant for small banks. This suggests that accounting information may be reliable only for 
large banks. However, this result could be due to the fact that the indicators selected by the 
stepwise process applied to the whole sample of banks are not the best indicators for the sub-
sample of small banks. Therefore, we run the stepwise process on the two sub-samples of 
banks separately. The results, which are shown in Table 9, confirm the absence of significant 
indicators to predict downgrades for small banks. Indeed, the stepwise process is unable to 
select any significant (10 percent level) accounting indicator for small banks.  
 
Insert Table 9 
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Table 9A presents the same results using dummy variables rather than sub-samples.  In Table 
9B, where GDPPERCAPITA is introduced, we can notice that this variable is not significant 
for large banks but is significant at the 10 percent level for small banks. Table 9C shows the 
same results running the regressions on the sub-samples. 
 
 
4.4. Balance sheet structure effect 
We try to capture the effectiveness of early indicators for different balance sheet profiles. 
First, we consider the structure of assets via the importance of the ratio of net loans to total 
assets. Then, we study the impact of the structure of liabilities by considering alternatively the 
importance of the ratio of deposits to total assets and of the ratio of market funded liabilities 
to total assets. In each case, we consider the impact of the balance sheet structure (assets or 
liabilities) by running the regressions on two sub-samples constructed on the basis of the 
considered ratio: a sub-sample of banks with a high value of the ratio and a sub-sample of 
banks with a low value of the considered ratio. The threshold is the median value of the ratio. 
 
 
4.4.1 Structure of bank assets 
We separate banks on the basis of their loan activity. 
 
 
Insert Table 10 and Table 11 
 
 
Considering the same indicators that are selected on the whole sample of banks (Table 10), 
we can notice that they are almost all significant for the two sub-samples of banks.  When we 
run the stepwise process separately on the two sub-samples (Table 11), we see that one 
indicator reflecting earnings (ΔROE) appears as the best predictor of bank financial distress 
for banks heavily involved in loan activity whereas three different indicators are selected for 
banks with a lower value of the ratio of net loans to total assets.  
Thus, it seems that bank asset structure does not deeply affect the accuracy of accounting 
indicators; accounting information is useful to predict bank financial distress of banks 
whatever their structure of assets. 
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4.4.1 Structure of bank liabilities 
First, we separate banks on the basis of their deposit activity. 
 
Insert Table 12 and 13 
 
 
The results obtained when we consider the indicators selected by the stepwise process ran on 
the whole sample of banks (Table 12) indicate that these indicators are not significant for 
banks focused on deposit activities, which may indicate that accounting information is only 
useful for banks with a relatively low deposit activity and more reliant on market debt or other 
sources of funding. However, when we consider the results obtained in Table 13, that is when 
we run the stepwise process separately on the two sub-samples, we see that the accurate 
indicators are different in the two sub-samples but accounting information is useful for both 
sub-samples. 
 
When we consider the results obtained when we separate the banks on the basis of the ratio of 
market funded liabilities to total assets (Table 14 and Table 15), the conclusions remain the 
same.  
 
 
Insert Table 14 and 15 
 
5. Conclusions 
 The aim of this study is to first understand how the rating agencies determine banks’ 
financial health based primarily on accounting information to predict the financial distress of 
MENA banks. It also tests for the presence of a too-big-to-fail effect.  Results reflect the 
crucial role of the level and change of capital, asset quality, earnings, and liquidity ratios in 
improving the prediction of future distress. Additional factors that contribute to the 
improvement of the prediction models are the change in costs to income, change in net 
interest revenue to assets, and the change in ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans.  We 
observe that influence of factors vary across size of the banks as smaller banks are impacted 
by the outstanding credit and funding strategies.  As MENA regulators make policies and 
provide guidelines for local banks on safety and soundness, learning from the style, approach, 
and experience of international rating agencies could be important. 
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Table 1. Distribution of Banks by Country 
 
COUNTRY NUMBER
BAHRAIN 6 
EGYPT 2 
ISRAEL 3 
JORDAN 4 
KUWAIT 5 
LEBANON 2 
MOROCCO 2 
OMAN 4 
QATAR 4 
SAUDI ARABIA 9 
TUNISIA 1 
TURKEY 16 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATS 9 
TOTAL 67 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics on Summary Accounting Information for the Period 1997-2007. 
 
Whole sample  
  
Mean2 
 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation2 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
Total Assets (in million USD) 12632.25 5976.10 17454.85 28.6 162567.40
Net Loans1/ Total Assets (%) 49.79 50.55 15.58 2.65 82.82
Deposits/ Total Assets (%) 80.20 82.82 9.76 0.00 97.65
Subordinated Debt/ Total Assets 
(%) 
0.83 0 1.23 0.00 5.67
Tier 1 Ratio (%) 16.62 15.25 8.18 6.10 72.40
ROA (%) 1.94 1.97 2.16 -24.12 13.15
1 Net loans are defined as gross loans less loan loss reserves. 
2 Each mean is calculated as 


N
j
jt
T
t
X
NT
X
11
1
 where N is the number of banks and T is the number of financial reports. 
Standard deviations were computed on a similar basis. 
 
Group A: 
  
Mean2 
 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation2 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
Total Assets (in million USD) 9218.29 5160.48 9306.60 874.50 39995.00
Net Loans1/ Total Assets (%) 38.90 39.41 10.57 19.58 66.62
Deposits/ Total Assets (%) 85.33 86.36 4.07 73.12 91.88
Subordinated Debt/ Total Assets (%) 0.68 0.25 0.81 0.00 2.87
Tier 1 Ratio (%) 14.48 14.5 5.50 6.10 31.10
ROA (%) 1.19 1.06 1.40 -0.19 13.01
1 Net loans are defined as gross loans less loan loss reserves. 
2 Each mean is calculated as 


N
j
jt
T
t
X
NT
X
11
1
 where N is the number of banks and T is the number of financial reports. 
Standard deviations were computed on a similar basis. 
 
 
Group B: 
  
Mean2 
 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation2 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
Total Assets (in million USD) 8897.69 5502.85 9296.30 239.30 55657.90
Net Loans1/ Total Assets (%) 51.81 52.26 14.97 2.65 82.82
Deposits/ Total Assets (%) 80.05 82.28 7.85 46.70 94.05
Subordinated Debt/ Total Assets (%) 0.58 0 1.12 0.00 5.67
Tier 1 Ratio (%) 17.54 16.20 6.59 8.70 48.50
ROA (%) 2.35 2.23 1.47 -6.11 13.15
1 Net loans are defined as gross loans less loan loss reserves. 
2 Each mean is calculated as 


N
j
jt
T
t
X
NT
X
11
1
 where N is the number of banks and T is the number of financial reports. 
Standard deviations were computed on a similar basis. 
 
Group C: 
 
 
 
Mean2 
 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation2 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
Total Assets (in million USD) 28288.86 17268.10 30648.61 28.60 162567.40
Net Loans1/ Total Assets (%) 51.85 56.04 17.39 9.17 76.67
Deposits/ Total Assets (%) 76.50 80.70 15.56 0.00 97.65
Subordinated Debt/ Total Assets (%) 1.61 1.34 1.50 0.00 5.41
Tier 1 Ratio (%) 15.32 11.80 12.29 6.10 72.40
ROA (%) 0.97 1.16 3.87 -24.12 10.75
1 Net loans are defined as gross loans less loan loss reserves. 
2 Each mean is calculated as 


N
j
jt
T
t
X
NT
X
11
1
 where N is the number of banks and T is the number of financial reports. 
Standard deviations were computed on a similar basis. 
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Table 3. Downgrades Information 
(Number of clean downgrades in parenthesis)   
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
            
Fitch 
Individual 3 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 10 (4) 11 (6) 3 (3) 2 (1)  1 (1)  21 (11)
Fitch Long 
Term 2 (2)   24 (11) 9 (3) 11 (2)     1 (0) 
Fitch Short 
Term    2 (2) 3 (1) 3 (2)     1 (0) 
TOTAL 5 (3) 1 (1) 1 (1) 36 (17) 23 (10) 17 (7) 2 (1)  1 (1)  23 (11)
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Table 4.  Distribution of Downgrades  
(Number of clean downgrades in parenthesis)   
 
Fitch individual 
 
FROM A/B B B/C C C/D D 
TO             
B 1 (0)           
B/C   7 (4)         
C     
17 
(13)       
C/D       13 (8)     
D     1 (0)   7 (2)   
D/E         4 (2)   
E         1 (0) 1 (0) 
F            1 (0) 
 
Fitch Long Term 
 
FROM A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB BB- B+ B B- 
TO                         
A- 1 (1) 2 (2)                     
BBB+     3 (3)                   
BBB        2 (0)                 
BBB-                         
BB+           2 (1)             
BB                         
BB-               2 (2)         
B+                 10 (8)       
B                 2 (0) 8 (0)     
B-                   2 (0) 11 (1)   
CCC+                       2 (0) 
 
Fitch Short Term 
 
FROM F1 F2 F3 B 
TO         
F2 3 (3)       
F3   3 (1)     
B     2 (1)   
C       1 (0) 
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Table 5. Accounting Ratios 
 
CATEGORY DEFINITION NAME 
CAPITAL 
Capital funds/ Deposits and short term funds CAPFUNDS_DEPSTFUND 
Capital funds/ total liabilities CAPFUNDS_LIAB 
Capital funds/ net loans CAPFUNDS_NL 
Capital funds/ total assets CAPFUNDS_TA 
Equity/ deposits and short term funds EQU_DEPSTFUND 
Equity/ total liabilities EQU_LIAB 
Equity/ net loans EQU_NL 
Equity/ total assets EQU_TA 
Subordinated debt/ capital funds SUB_CAPFUNDS 
Total capital ratio TCR 
Tier1 ratio TIER1RATIO 
Hybrid capital/ total liabilities HYBRIDCAP_LIAB 
Hybrid capital/ total assets HYBRIDCAP_TA 
ASSET 
QUALITY 
Loan loss reserves/ impaired loans LLR_IMPLOANS 
Impaired loans/ gross loans IMPLOANS_GL 
Loan loss provision/ net interest revenue LLP_NIR 
Loan loss reserve/ gross loan LLR_GL 
Net charge off/ gross loan NCO_GL 
Net charge off/ net income before loan loss 
provision 
NCO_NIBLLP 
Loan loss provision/ total assets LLP_TA 
Loan loss provision/ gross loan LLP_GL 
Loan loss reserves/ total assets LLR_TA 
EARNINGS 
Cost to income ratio COSTTOINCOME 
Income net of distribution/ average equity INCNET_EQU 
Net interest margin NIM 
Net interest revenue/ average assets  NIR_A 
Non interest expenses/ average assets NONINTEXP_A 
Non operating items and taxes/ average assets NONOPIT_A 
Non operating items/ net income NONOPIT_NETINC 
Other operating income/ average assets OTHOPINC_A 
Pre-tax operating income/ average assets PRETAXOPINC_A 
Roa ROA 
Roe ROE 
Recurring earning power = (before tax profits + 
provisions for bad debts)/total assets 
RECUREARNPOWER 
LIQUIDITY 
Interbank ratio INTERBANK 
Liquid assets/ total deposits and borrowings LIQUASSETS_TOTDEPBOR
Liquid assets/ customer and short term funds LIQUASSETS_CSTFUND 
Net loans/ customer and short term funds NL_CSTFUND 
Net loans/ total deposits and borrowings NL_DEPBOR 
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Table 6. Financial Deterioration and Early Indicators: Univariate Regressions  
Model Specification:  Prob    ii XY   1  
 
 
This table shows simple logit estimation results where the dependent variable is separately regressed on each explanatory variable and a 
constant. Group A corresponds to the sub-sample of banks that are from Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, or Tunisia, Group B 
corresponds to the sub-sample of banks that are from Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia or United Arab Emirates, and Group C 
corresponds to the sub-sample of banks that are from Israel or Turkey. For regional estimations, two dummy variables are added: 
GROUPA, which is equal to 1, if the bank belongs to Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, or Tunisia and 0, otherwise, and GROUPC, which 
is equal to1, if the bank belongs to Israel or Turkey. This model explains downgrades (whatever their extent) that occur in the next calendar 
year. Standard errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance, 
respectively. Z-Stats are in italics. The number of observations in the regional model is not equal to the sum of the number of observations 
of Group A, Group B, and Group C models because all data are not available for each bank, each year and each indicator. 
 
  Whole 
sample 
Regional 
dummies 
Group A Group B Group C 
CAPITAL 
 
ΔHYBRIDCAP_LIAB -3.260** 
(-2.523) 
-4.154*** 
(-2.977) 
   
ΔHYBRIDCAP_TA -3.260** 
(-2.309) 
-4.230*** 
(-2.780) 
   
ΔEQU_DEPSTFUND    -0.118** 
(-2.085) 
 
ΔEQU_LIAB    -0.132** 
(-2.146) 
 
ΔEQU_TA    -0.236** 
(-2.530) 
 
ΔCAPFUNDS_NL   0.131* 
(1.779) 
  
ΔTCR     0.515** 
(2.052) 
ΔTIER1RATIO     0.283** 
(2.072) 
ASSET 
QUALITY 
 
ΔLLR_GL 0.133** 
(2.092) 
0.132** 
(2.094) 
0.577** 
(2.479) 
  
ΔIMPLOANS_GL 0.269*** 
(3.167) 
0.276*** 
(3.139) 
0.424** 
(2.328) 
0.261*** 
(2.618) 
 
ΔLLR_IMPLOANS    -0.012* 
(-1.689) 
 
ΔLLP_NIR     0.114*** 
(2.944) 
ΔLLP_GL   -2.661*** 
(-3.046) 
  
EARNINGS 
 
ΔCOSTTOINCOME 0.069*** 
(3.482) 
0.070*** 
(3.554) 
 0.088*** 
(3.649) 
 
ΔINCNET_EQU -0.071** 
(-2.531) 
-0.074*** 
(-2.653) 
 -0.080** 
(-2.528) 
 
ΔNONINTEXP_A 0.724** 
(2.222) 
0.735** 
(2.323) 
 1.277*** 
(2.729) 
 
ΔROE -0.059** 
(-2.464) 
-0.060*** 
(-2.601) 
-0.116* 
(-1.938) 
-0.083** 
(-2.434) 
 
ΔNIM   -2.173** 
(-2.181) 
  
ΔNONINTEXP_A   -2.633** 
(-2.407) 
  
ΔNIR_A   -3.382*** 
(-2.742) 
  
LIQUIDITY 
 
ΔNL_CSTFUND -0.043* 
(-1.800) 
-0.044* 
(-1.801) 
 -0.070* 
(-1.810) 
 
ΔINTERBANK   0.006* 
(1.790) 
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Table 7. Financial Deterioration and Early Indicators: Stepwise Results 
Model Specification:  Prob   


  

J
j
jiji CY
1
1   
 
 
  Whole sample Group A Group B Group C 
 CONSTANT -1.797*** 
(-8.584) 
-2.652*** 
(-3.642) 
-1.900*** 
(-6.676) 
-2.081*** 
(-3.819) 
CAPITAL ΔEQU_DEPSTFUND 
 
 
   0.019* 
(1.786) 
EARNINGS 
 
ΔCOSTTOINCOME 0.083*** 
(3.522) 
 0.112*** 
(3.617) 
 
ΔNIR_A  -4.466** 
(-2.552) 
  
ASSET QUALITY 
 
ΔIMPLOANS_GL 0.241** 
(2.559) 
 0.210** 
(2.491) 
 
ΔLLP_NIR 0.030* 
(1.878) 
  0.114*** 
(2.968) 
ΔLLR_GL  0.507*** 
(2.851) 
  
ΔLLP_TA   1.363** 
(1.970) 
 
McFadden R2  0.142 0.380 0.199 0.175 
Total Observations  238 54 151 47 
Number of 
observations with 
Y=1 
 35 8 21 7 
 
This table shows logit estimation results where the dependent variable is regressed on a constant 
and the accounting indicators selected by a stepwise process. This model explains downgrades 
(whatever their extent) that occur in the next calendar year. Standard errors are adjusted using the 
Huber-White method. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10% level of significance, respectively. Z-
Stats are in italics.  
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Table 8  Too Big To Fail and Effectiveness of Early Indicators 
Model Specification:  Prob   


  

J
j
jiji CY
1
1   
 
  TBTF NON TBTF 
 CONSTANT -1.575*** 
(-6.691) 
-2.477*** 
(-5.136) 
EARNINGS 
 
ΔCOSTTOINCOME 0.113*** 
(3.429) 
0.031 
(0.754) 
ASSET QUALITY 
 
ΔIMPLOANS_GL 0.278** 
(2.430) 
0.218 
(1.144) 
ΔLLP_NIR 0.051** 
(2.434) 
-0.001 
(-0.030) 
McFadden R2  0.190 0.061 
Total Observations  169 69 
Number of observations with Y=1  30 5 
This table shows logit estimation results where the dependent variable is regressed on a constant 
and the accounting indicators selected by a stepwise process on the whole sample of banks. This 
model explains downgrades (whatever their extent) that occur in the next calendar year. Standard 
errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10% level of 
significance, respectively. Z-Stats are in italics. TBTF banks are those with a Fitch Support rating 
equal to 1 or 2.  
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Table  9. Too Big To Fail and Effectiveness of Early Indicators: New Stepwise 
Model Specification:  Prob   


  

J
j
jiji CY
1
1   
 
  TBTF NON TBTF 
 CONSTANT -1.575*** 
(0.235) 
 
EARNINGS 
 
ΔCOSTTOINCOME 0.113*** 
(3.429) 
 
ASSET QUALITY 
 
ΔIMPLOANS_GL 0.278** 
(2.430) 
 
ΔLLP_NIR 0.051** 
(2.434) 
 
McFadden R2  0.190  
Total Observations  169  
Number of observations with Y=1  30  
This table shows logit estimation results where the dependent variable is regressed on a constant 
and the accounting indicators selected by new stepwise processes. This model explains 
downgrades (whatever their extent) that occur in the next calendar year. Standard errors are 
adjusted using the Huber-White method. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10 percent level of 
significance, respectively. Z-Stats are in italics. TBTF banks are those with a Fitch Support rating 
equal to 1 or 2.  
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Table  9A. Too Big To Fail and Effectiveness of Early Indicators 
Model Specification:  Prob  
1 1
1 ' * _
J J
i j ji j ji
j j
Y C C DUM TBTF  
 
          
 
   
 CONSTANT -2.477*** 
(-5.136) 
EARNINGS 
 
ΔCOSTTOINCOME 0.031 
(0.754) 
ASSET QUALITY 
 
ΔIMPLOANS_GL 0.218 
(1.144) 
ΔLLP_NIR -0.001 
(-0.030) 
 DUM_TBTF 0.902* 
(1.680) 
 DUM_TBTF* ΔCOSTTOINCOME 0.081 
(1.512) 
 DUM_TBTF* ΔIMPLOANS_GL 0.059 
(0.267) 
 DUM_TBTF* ΔLLP_NIR 0.052 
(1.313) 
McFadden R2  0.186 
Total observations  238 
Number of observations with Y=1  35 
Risk level to reject '1 1 0     3.29% 
Risk level to reject '2 2 0     1.51% 
Risk level to reject '3 3 0     94.75% 
This table shows logit estimation results where the dependent variable is regressed on a constant 
and the accounting indicators selected by a stepwise process on the whole sample of banks. This 
model explains downgrades (whatever their extent) that occur in the next calendar year. Standard 
errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level of significance, respectively. Z-Stats are in italics. The dummy variable DUM_TBTF takes 
the value of 1 if the bank is TBTF and 0 otherwise. TBTF banks are those with a Fitch Support 
rating equal to 1 or 2.  
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Table  9B. Too Big To Fail and Effectiveness of Early Indicators 
Model Specification: 
Prob
 1 ' * _ ' * _
1 1
J J
Y C C DUM TBTF GDPPERCAPITA GDPPERCAPITA DUM TBTF
i j ji j jij j
           
 
    
 
   
 CONSTANT -3.284*** 
(-3.612) 
EARNINGS 
 
ΔCOSTTOINCOME -0.007 
(-0.147) 
ASSET QUALITY 
 
ΔIMPLOANS_GL 0.254 
(1.258) 
ΔLLP_NIR -0.035 
(-0.700) 
 DUM_TBTF 1.544 
(1.262) 
 DUM_TBTF* ΔCOSTTOINCOME 0.052 
(0.657) 
 DUM_TBTF* ΔIMPLOANS_GL 0.033 
(0.135) 
 DUM_TBTF* ΔLLP_NIR 0.065 
(1.179) 
 GDPPERCAPITA 0.0002* 
(1.851) 
 DUM_TBTF*GDPPERCAPITA -0001 
(-1.625) 
McFadden R2  0.116 
Total Observations  179 
Number of observations with Y=1  24 
Risk level to reject '1 1 0     3.36% 
Risk level to reject '2 2 0     47.33% 
Risk level to reject '3 3 0     3.89% 
Risk level to reject ' 0     19.48% 
This table shows logit estimation results where the dependent variable is regressed on a constant and the accounting 
indicators selected by a stepwise process on the whole sample of banks. This model explains downgrades (whatever their 
extent) that occur in the next calendar year. Standard errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. ***, ** and * 
pertain to 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance, respectively. Z-Stats are in italics. The dummy variable DUM_TBTF 
takes the value of 1 if the bank is TBTF and 0 otherwise. TBTF banks are those with a Fitch Support rating equal to 1 or 2.  
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Table 9C. Too Big To Fail and Effectiveness of Early Indicators: New Stepwise 
Model Specification:  Prob   


  

J
j
jiji CY
1
1   
 
  TBTF NON TBTF 
 CONSTANT -1.74** 
(-2.124) 
-3.284*** 
(-3.612) 
EARNINGS 
 
ΔCOSTTOINCOME 0.045 
(0.717) 
-0.007 
(-0.147) 
ASSET QUALITY 
 
ΔIMPLOANS_GL 0.287** 
(2.065) 
0.254 
(1.258) 
ΔLLP_NIR 0.030 
(1.296) 
-0.035 
(-0.700) 
 GDPPERCAPITA 3.57*10-6
(0.065) 
0.0002* 
(1.851) 
McFadden R2  0.089 0.181 
Total observations  128 51 
Number of observations with Y=1  19 5 
This table shows logit estimation results where the dependent variable is regressed on a constant 
and the accounting indicators selected by new stepwise processes. This model explains 
downgrades (whatever their extent) that occur in the next calendar year. Standard errors are 
adjusted using the Huber-White method. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10 percent level of 
significance, respectively. Z-Stats are in italics. TBTF banks are those with a Fitch Support rating 
equal to 1 or 2.  
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Table 9D. Bank Size and Effectiveness of Early Indicators 
Model Specification:  Prob   


  

J
j
jiji CY
1
1   
 
  Large banks Small banks 
 CONSTANT -2.121*** 
(-7.310) 
-1.707*** 
(-5.116) 
EARNINGS 
 
ΔCOSTTOINCOME 0.110*** 
(3.692) 
0.049 
(1.190) 
ASSET QUALITY 
 
ΔIMPLOANS_GL 0.009 
(0.069) 
0.329*** 
(2.841) 
ΔLLP_NIR 0.051** 
(2.430) 
0.017 
(1.123) 
McFadden R2  0.154 0.168 
Total Observations  147 91 
Number of observations with Y=1  20 15 
This table shows logit estimation results where the dependent variable is regressed on a constant 
and the accounting indicators selected by a stepwise process on the whole sample of banks. This 
model explains downgrades (whatever their extent) that occur in the next calendar year. Standard 
errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level of significance, respectively. Z-Stats are in italics. Large banks are those with total assets 
greater than the median value that is 5160.48 million USD for banks belonging to Group A (Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia), 5502.85 million USD for banks belonging to Group B 
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates), and 17 268.10 million 
USD for banks belonging to Group C (Israel and Turkey). 
 
 
25 
 
Table  9E. Bank Size and Effectiveness of Early Indicators: New Stepwise 
 Model Specification:  Prob   


  

J
j
jiji CY
1
1   
 
  Large banks Small banks
 
CONSTANT -2.101*** 
(-7.480) 
-1.960*** 
(-5.033) 
CAPITAL 
ΔEQU_NL 0.061* 
(1.892) 
 
EARNINGS 
 
ΔCOSTTOINCOME 0.114*** 
(4.004) 
 
ΔNIR_A  -0.537* 
(-1.783) 
ASSET QUALITY 
 
ΔLLP_NIR  0.041* 
(1.901) 
 
ΔIMPLOANS_GL  0.411*** 
(3.540) 
LIQUIDITY 
ΔLIQUASSETS_CSTFUND  0.057** 
(2.118) 
McFadden R2  0.149 0.203 
Total Observations  161 92 
Number of observations with Y=1  21 14 
This table shows logit estimation results where the dependent variable is regressed on a constant 
and the accounting indicators selected by new stepwise processes. This model explains 
downgrades (whatever their extent) that occur in the next calendar year. Standard errors are 
adjusted using the Huber-White method. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10 percent level of 
significance, respectively. Z-Stats are in italics. Large banks are those with total assets greater than 
the median value that is 5160.48 million USD for banks belonging to Group A (Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia), 5502.85 million USD for banks belonging to Group B (Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates), and 17 268.10 million USD for 
banks belonging to Group C (Israel and Turkey). 
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Table  10. Structure of Bank Assets and Effectiveness of Early Indicators 
Model Specification:  Prob   


  

J
j
jiji CY
1
1   
 
  Net loans/ Total 
assets low 
Net loans / total assets 
high 
 CONSTANT -2.083*** 
(-5.911) 
-1.593*** 
(-5.856) 
EARNINGS 
 
ΔCOSTTOINCOME 0.073** 
(2.373) 
0.114** 
(2.847) 
ASSET QUALITY 
 
ΔIMPLOANS_GL 0.332** 
(2.077) 
0.169* 
(1.697) 
ΔLLP_NIR 0.021 
(1.041) 
0.035* 
(1.737) 
McFadden R2  0.226 0.090 
Total Observations  122 116 
Number of observations 
with Y=1 
 15 20 
This table shows logit estimation results where the dependent variable is regressed on a constant 
and the accounting indicators selected by a stepwise process on the whole sample of banks. This 
model explains downgrades (whatever their extent) that occur in the next calendar year. Standard 
errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level of significance, respectively. Z-Stats are in italics. The ratio Net loans/ total assets is 
considered as low if it is lower than its median value and it is considered as high if it is greater 
than its median value. This median value is equal to 39.41 percent for banks belonging to Group A 
(Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia), 52.26 percent for banks belonging to Group B 
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates), and 56.04 percent for 
banks belonging to Group C (Israel and Turkey). 
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Table 11. Structure of Bank Assets and Effectiveness of Early Indicators: New Stepwise 
Model Specification:  Prob   


  

J
j
jiji CY
1
1   
 
 
 Net loans/ Total 
assets low 
Net loans / total 
assets high 
 
CONSTANT -2.121*** 
(-5.794) 
-1.726*** 
(-6.648) 
EARNINGS 
 
ΔCOSTTOINCOME 0.064** 
(2.342) 
 
ΔROE  -0.137** 
(-2.529) 
ASSET QUALITY 
 
ΔIMPLOANS_GL 0.342** 
(2.391) 
 
LIQUIDITY 
ΔLIQUASSETS_CSTFUND 0.025* 
(1.658) 
 
McFadden R2  0.218 0.064 
Total Observations  124 130 
Number of observations 
with Y=1 
 15 21 
This table shows logit estimation results where the dependent variable is regressed on a constant 
and the accounting indicators selected by new stepwise processes. This model explains 
downgrades (whatever their extent) that occur in the next calendar year. Standard errors are 
adjusted using the Huber-White method. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10 percent level of 
significance, respectively. Z-Stats are in italics. The ratio Net loans/ total assets is considered as 
low if it is lower than its median value and it is considered as high if it is greater than its median 
value. This median value is equal to 39.41 percent  for banks belonging to Group A (Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia), 52.26 percent  for banks belonging to Group B (Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates), and 56.04 percent for banks 
belonging to Group C (Israel and Turkey). 
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Table 12. Structure of Bank Liabilities and Effectiveness of Early Indicators 
Model Specification:  Prob   


  

J
j
jiji CY
1
1   
 
  Deposits/ total assets 
low 
Deposits/ total assets 
high 
 CONSTANT -1.672*** 
(-5.571) 
-1.922*** 
(-6.393) 
EARNINGS 
 
ΔCOSTTOINCOME 0.093*** 
(3.189) 
0.073 
(1.602) 
ASSET QUALITY 
 
ΔIMPLOANS_GL 0.466*** 
(2.677) 
0.116 
(1.093) 
ΔLLP_NIR 0.026 
(0.895) 
0.033 
(1.531) 
McFadden R2  0.228 0.075 
Total Observations  121 117 
Number of observations with 
Y=1 
 20 15 
This table shows logit estimation results where the dependent variable is regressed on a constant 
and the accounting indicators selected by a stepwise process on the whole sample of banks. This 
model explains downgrades (whatever their extent) that occur in the next calendar year. Standard 
errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10 percent  
level of significance, respectively. Z-Stats are in italics. The ratio Deposits/ total assets is 
considered as low if it is lower than its median value and it is considered as high if it is greater 
than its median value. This median value is equal to 86.36 percent  for banks belonging to Group 
A (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia), 82.28 percent  for banks belonging to Group B 
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates), and 80.70 percent  for 
banks belonging to Group C (Israel and Turkey). 
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Table 13. Structure of Bank Liabilities and Effectiveness of Early Indicators: New 
Stepwise 
Model Specification:  Prob   


  

J
j
jiji CY
1
1   
 
  Deposits/ total assets 
low 
Deposits/ total assets 
high 
 CONSTANT -1.629*** 
(-5.995) 
-2.144*** 
(-6.874) 
CAPITAL ΔEQU_TA -0.264** 
(-2.232) 
 
EARNINGS 
 
ΔOTHOPINC_A  -2.033** 
(-2.219) 
ΔNIR_A  -1.477** 
(-2.098) 
ASSET QUALITY ΔLLR_GL 0.331*** 
(2.705) 
 
McFadden R2  0.067 0.073 
Total Observations  114 124 
Number of observations with 
Y=1 
 17 14 
This table shows logit estimation results where the dependent variable is regressed on a constant 
and the accounting indicators selected by new stepwise processes. This model explains 
downgrades (whatever their extent) that occur in the next calendar year. Standard errors are 
adjusted using the Huber-White method. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10 percent  level of 
significance, respectively. Z-Stats are in italics. The ratio Deposits/ total assets is considered as 
low if it is lower than its median value and it is considered as high if it is greater than its median 
value. This median value is equal to 86.36 percent  for banks belonging to Group A (Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia), 82.28 percent  for banks belonging to Group B (Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates), and 80.70 percent for banks 
belonging to Group C (Israel and Turkey). 
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Table 14. Structure of Bank Liabilities and Effectiveness of Early Indicators 
Model Specification:  Prob   


  

J
j
jiji CY
1
1   
 
  Market funded 
liabilities/ total assets 
low 
Market funded liabilities/ 
total assets high 
 CONSTANT -1.590*** 
(-5.773) 
-2.114*** 
(-6.117) 
EARNINGS 
 
ΔCOSTTOINCOME 0.027 
(0.713) 
0.121*** 
(3.735) 
ASSET QUALITY 
 
ΔIMPLOANS_GL 0.213* 
(1.924) 
0.282* 
(1.735) 
ΔLLP_NIR 0.027 
(1.105) 
0.038* 
(1.767) 
McFadden R2  0.073 0.243 
Total Observations  112 126 
Number of 
observations with Y=1 
 17 18 
This table shows logit estimation results where the dependent variable is regressed on a constant 
and the accounting indicators selected by a stepwise process on the whole sample of banks. This 
model explains downgrades (whatever their extent) that occur in the next calendar year. Standard 
errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10 percent  
level of significance, respectively. Z-Stats are in italics. The ratio Market funded liabilities/ total 
assets is considered as low if it is lower than its median value and it is considered as high if it is 
greater than its median value. This median value is equal to 5.84 percent  for banks belonging to 
Group A (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia), 4.27 percent  for banks belonging to 
Group B (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates), and 10.50 
percent  for banks belonging to Group C (Israel and Turkey). 
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Table 15. Structure of Bank Liabilities and Effectiveness of Early Indicators: New 
Stepwise 
Model Specification:  Prob   


  

J
j
jiji CY
1
1   
 
  Market funded 
liabilities/ total assets 
low 
Market funded liabilities/ 
total assets high 
 CONSTANT -1.629*** 
(-5.995) 
-2.114*** 
(-6.117) 
CAPITAL ΔEQU_TA -0.264** 
(-2.232) 
 
EARNINGS 
 
ΔCOSTTOINCOME  0.121*** 
(3.735) 
ASSET QUALITY ΔIMPLOANS_GL  0.282* 
(1.735) 
ΔLLR_GL 0.331*** 
(2.705) 
 
ΔLLPROV_NIR  0.038* 
(1.767) 
McFadden R2  0.067 0.243 
Total Observations  114 126 
Number of 
observations with Y=1 
 17 18 
This table shows logit estimation results where the dependent variable is regressed on a constant 
and the accounting indicators selected by new stepwise processes. This model explains 
downgrades (whatever their extent) that occur in the next calendar year. Standard errors are 
adjusted using the Huber-White method. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10 percent  level of 
significance, respectively. Z-Stats are in italics. The ratio Market funded liabilities/ total assets is 
considered as low if it is lower than its median value and it is considered as high if it is greater 
than its median value. This median value is equal to 5.84 percent  for banks belonging to Group A 
(Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia), 4.27 percent  for banks belonging to Group B 
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates), and 10.50 percent  for 
banks belonging to Group C (Israel and Turkey). 
 
 
 
